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The Salafism in Europe
Be tween Hi jra and Ji had
MARIUS I. LAZĂR
Salafism repre sents a con ser va tive in ter pre ta tion of the Is lamic doc trine and 
of the po liti cal his tory of the Mus lim world, which emerged in the first years of Is-
lam. In fact, its very name tes ti fies to its ori gin: Salaf al-Sa hilin, ”the pi ous an ces-
tors”, that is the Prophet, the cir cle of his fol low ers and the first four ca liphs, 
re garded as au then tic mod els for Mus lim be hav iour and re li gious prac tices. Along 
the cen tu ries, some Sunni theo lo gi ans have of ten in ter preted the re li gious or po liti-
cal fail ures of the Mus lim world as a con se quence of the es trange ment from this 
origi nal ar che type. For this rea son, they will sug gest suc ces sive ref or ma tions of 
the so ci ety and of Is lamic con science in or der to re store them to their au then tic, 
origi nal state. The best known of these re form ers are: Ibn Hand bal, 9th cen tury, Ibn 
Taimi yya, 13th-14th cen tu ries, Mu ham mad Abd-ul Wahhab, 18th cen tury, Ja mal 
al-Din al-Af gani (1838-1897) and, more re cently, Ab de laziz Ben Baz (for mer great 
mufti of Saudi Ara bia un til 1999) and Na sir ud-Din al-Al bani (1914-1999).
The Salafi move ments, which islamolo gists such as Oliv ier Roy have also la-
belled ”neo-fun da men tal ist”, de cline to in te grate Europe in the area of Dar al-Is-
lam and re gard the Euro pean ter ri tory ei ther as Dar al-Solh (land of the pact, in 
which Mus lims take no vio lent ac tion against the non-be liev ers – this is the po si-
tion of pie tis tic Salafism) or as a part of Dar al-Harb (land of the war). This op tion 
car ries con sid er able weight be cause it mo ti vates the at ti tude of re ject ing the cul-
tural and re li gious West ern val ues, as well as le giti mis ing radi cal ac tions taken in 
the name of a Ji had against the non-be liev ers. How ever, like the Mus lim Broth er-
hood, Euro pean Salafism should be un der stood in all its com plex ity, since it is 
noth ing but a ge neric term that cov ers a di verse range of move ments and ten den-
cies in con stant ri valry and dis agree ment with one an other. Any at tempt at clas si-
fy ing the Sala fite move ments, whether in the Mus lim world or in Europe and 
other coun tries, first needs to dif fer en ti ate be tween the pie tis tic and the radi cal 
Salafism, the lat ter also known as Ji hadist.
”Shaykh ist” Salafism
The pie tis tic Salafi move ments are also known as ”shaykh ist” be cause they 
strictly fol low the teach ings of vari ous sheiks and ule mas in the Ara bic Pen in sula 
(apart from Ben Baz and al-Al bani, the most im por tant ones were or are Ibn 
Uthaymin (who died in 2001), Salih al-Faw zan, Rabi Ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, 
Al-Cheikh – the new great mufti of the Saudi King dom, and Mu qbil ibn Hadi 
(who died in 2001)1. These pie tis tic move ments gen er ally pro mote a con ser va tive 
vi sion of Is lam in the man ner of Wahhabism. They place em pha sis on de vel op ing 
1 François BURGAT, L’Islamisme à l’heure d’Al-Qaida, La Découverte, Paris, 2005, pp. 32-39.
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a uni ver sal type of Mus lim, with no spe cific cul tural al le giances, whose iden tity is 
based on the strict ob ser vance of a clearly spelled out theo logi cal and be hav ioural 
cate chism. Their found ing prin ci ple is that so cial changes meant to in crease ob ser-
vance of Is lamic norms must be based, above all, on im prov ing in di vid ual be hav-
iour. In fact, the emer gence of Salafi move ments, es pe cially in Europe and North 
Amer ica, comes as a con se quence of the trans for ma tions brought about by glob al-
isa tion: ”Déstruc tu ra tion des so cié tes tra di tion nelles, re fon da tion de com mun au-
tés imagi naires à par tir de l’individu”1. Their ide ol ogy is founded on ob ser vance 
of a rigid set of rites, ob li ga tions and in ter dic tions which de fine the ”ab stract” 
Mus lim, who is com pletely de tached from any cul tural or so cial in flu ence (Is lamic 
or not, such an in flu ence is re garded as un ac cept able). There fore, such a per son is 
no longer the rep re sen ta tive of a cul ture and be comes a ho mo ge ne ous code, ready 
to ad just to any so ci ety: ”Le néo-fon da men tal isme est très claire ment un pro duit 
et un agent de la dé cul tura tion des so ciétés musul manes, ce qui ex plique et son 
suc cès et son trans na tion al isme”2. Thus, the Sala fites re fuse to build a mul ti cul-
tural Mus lim com mu nity; in stead, they criti cise lo cal Is lamic tra di tions, eth-
nic-based com mu ni ties, mod ern le gal defi ni tions of iden tity (citi zen ship), as well 
as any form of as simi la tion to West ern cul ture3. Such an un der stand ing ap peals to 
those in search for an iden tity: ”Le nou veau com mun au tarisme se con struit sur 
l’individualisme, c’est-à-dire à par tir de l’adhésion in di vidu elle, par le re tour per-
son nel à la pratique re ligieuse stricte, celle du code”; the fact that Salafism has 
been suc cess ful mainly among Mus lim com mu ni ties liv ing abroad is ex plained by 
its com pen sat ing for, as well as be ing a prod uct of, a ”crise de l’autorité”4.
Al though there are vari ous ideo logi cal ap proaches and a strong ri valry within 
the Salafi move ment, all its di rec tions fo cus on sev eral main themes: the su pe ri or-
ity of Is lam over the West ern world, the de cay of Mus lim so cie ties be cause of their 
es trange ment from the true faith, the need for a re turn to the origi nal Is lamic teach-
ings, an apoca lyp tic vi sion of a global bat tle be tween good and evil, fought by two 
ge neric en ti ties called the Is lam and the West (simi lar to the Welt an schauung of the 
Ameri can neo-con ser va tives but in re versed axio logi cal po lar ity). Unlike the Mus-
lim Broth ers, Salafi rep re sen ta tives op pose any po liti cal in volve ment and dis re-
gard na tional iden tity; most Salafi move ments strongly re ject con tem po rary 
po liti cal con cepts (state, na tion, citi zen ship) and re gard their im ple men ta tion in 
the Mus lim world as an es sen tial cause for the ”sepa ra tion” (fitna) which has frag-
mented the Is lamic com mu nity. The only le giti mate ref er ence is made to ’Umma, 
the con gre ga tion of all Mus lims, ir re spec tive of their geo graphi cal lo ca tion. There-
fore, Salafism pre sents a very spe cial geo po liti cal vi sion, which is fo cused on two 
main con cepts: Mus lim in di vidu als de fined as such and their unity of re lig ion and 
iden tity as rep re sented by ’Umma. Apart from these two ele ments, all other ref er-
ences to poli tics, cul ture or eth nic ity are re garded as il le giti mate and re jected. 
There are some Salafists, how ever, in par ticu lar those who have re sponded to the 
Ji hadist mes sage, who be lieve that the re turn to an au then tic Is lam is not pos si ble 
with out res ur rect ing the in sti tu tion of the ca liph ate, a fun da men tal cate gory in the 
Mus lim po liti cal tra di tion, the only le giti mate source of au thor ity.
1 Olivier ROY, L’Islam mondialisé, Seuil, Paris, 2002, p. 144.
2 Ibidem, p. 145.
3 Abderahim LAMCHICHI, Islam-Occident, Islam-Europe: choc des civilisations ou coexistence 
des cultures?, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2000, p. 40.
4 Olivier ROY, L’Islam mondialisé, op. cit., pp. 152-153.
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In Europe, this es trange ment from the lo cal cul tural and po liti cal en vi ron-
ment is fur ther en hanced by the aver sion felt by the Salafists (in con tra dic tion 
with the ecu meni cal ori en ta tion of tra di tional Is lam) against Chris ti an ity, Ju da ism 
and other re lig ions. The con cern for rit ual pu rity, which is a cen tral as pect of Salafi 
be hav iour, be comes ex ac er bated in Europe and in any other non-Is lamic re gions, 
as Salafism is de fined by fa vour ing an in ter pre ta tion of Is lam with de tailed fo cus 
on eth ics and be hav iour, based on strict ob ser vance of what is al lowed (ha lal) and 
re jec tion of what is for bid den (haram)1. All these norms, set by Mus lim Sunni ule-
mas with theo logi cal and le gal au thor ity, are care fully pre sented in text books, and 
more re cently on tele vi sion and the Inter net. It is an im por tant char ac ter is tic of 
Salafism that it gives cen tral im por tance to the au thor ity of ule mas, whose fat was 
or de ci sions are meant to pro vide for their fol low ers a ca noni cal her me neu tics, 
both of the Is lamic tra di tion and of the vari ous in no va tions and chal lenges that 
con front the Mus lim be liever in the con tem po rary world. Whether they are in te-
grated in the of fi cial state sys tem of Mus lim and non-Mus lim coun tries or they are 
in de pend ent, ule mas play an es sen tial part in the ideo logi cal mo bi li za tion and 
sub se quent ac tions of their fol low ers. Bene fit ing from the count less mosques and 
re li gious cen tres spread across the re gions where Mus lims live, Salafi ule mas act 
most ef fi ciently at the level of mi cro-com mu ni ties. The Mus lim Broth ers, Tabligh, 
the Saudi net works and the vari ous Salafi move ments are en gaged in a com pe ti-
tion over domi na tion of the most im por tant re li gious cen tres and mosques of a 
com mu nity, each of them at tempt ing to win over the be liev ers to its own po si tion. 
The al le giance of the imam or the re li gious leader in a mosque can sig nifi cantly in-
flu ence the at ti tude of the con gre ga tion; he can ef fi ciently di rect the re li gious zeal 
of his fol low ers to wards pie tism or, on the con trary, to wards vio lent ji hadist ac-
tion. The best-known Euro pean ex am ple is pro vided by the Lon don mosque of 
Fins bury Park, which, af ter fal ling un der the in flu ence of Abou Hamza al-Masri, 
has pushed to wards ji hadism many of the wor ship ers. One can not over em pha size 
the im por tance of ule mas as agents of the ideo logi cal and be hav ioural mo bi li sa tion 
of the Mus lim popu la tion, ir re spec tive of its geo graphi cal lo ca tion. The per son al ity 
of the re li gious ruler, whether he is the av er age preacher of a neighbour hood 
mosque, or a high-pro file leader of in ter na tional repu ta tion, is al ways de ci sive for 
the be hav iour of a large part of the peo ple who ac knowl edge his au thor ity. Since 
Sunni Is lam does not rec og nize any unique and uni ver sal re li gious au thor ity that 
could pro vide a uni fied and un con tro ver sial per spec tive on re li gious dog mas, this 
situa tion has made room for a con stant ”lib er ali sa tion” of Mus lim re li gious theo-
ries and at ti tudes. Thus, al ter na tive in ter pre ta tions be come pos si ble, as well as the 
dif fer en tial at tach ment of the be liev ers to vari ous forms of un der stand ing and 
prac tis ing Is lamic tra di tion.
While main tain ing its own iden tity, the Salafism of re cent dec ades has largely 
been the re sult of Wahhabi ide ol ogy, and its global ex pan sion has chiefly been fos-
tered by Saudi poli cies of pro mot ing a con ser va tive vi sion of Is lam, which be gan 
af ter Fay sal be came king in 1964, and in creased with the avail abil ity of pet ro dol lars 
in the 1970s2. Since then, Saudi Ara bia has at tempted to gain geo po liti cal in flu ence 
1 Mohamed-Ali ADRAOUI, ”Purist Salafism in France”, ISIM Review, no. 21, Spring 2008, 
pp. 12-13. 
2 Ahmad MOUSSALLI, Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who Is the Enemy?, A Conflicts 
Forum Monograph, January 2009, http://conflictsforum.org/briefings/Wahhabism-Salafism-and-
Islamism.pdf (accessed on 05.03.2009)
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over the whole Sunni-Mus lim world by re dis trib ut ing oil wealth to wards the im-
ple men ta tion of Islamisa tion pro jects and the re cruit ment of an elite who, taught 
in Wahhabi schools, was to bring Saudi Is lam to their own coun tries, very of ten to 
the det ri ment of lo cal Is lamic tra di tion. The main in stru ments for ex port ing this 
”soft” Islam ism – in prin ci ple, non-vio lent and es sen tially di rected to wards 
adopt ing con ser va tive Mus lim at ti tudes – have been the many pan-Is lamic Saudi 
in sti tu tions and or gani za tions, Mus lim chari ties and Is lamic banks. All these will 
un avoid ably end up tar get ing the Mus lim com mu ni ties in Europe, where Saudi 
pro grammes com pete with those of Tabligh and the Mus lim Broth er hood, each 
move ment fight ing for the sym bolic capi tal of the Is lamic tra di tion. To a cer tain ex-
tent, each of them also claims an ex clu siv ist ca noni cal su pe ri or ity, which tends to 
can cel out the rela tive lib er ali sa tion of the Sunni land scape oc ca sioned by the theo-
logi cal and le gal plu ral ism of the four of fi cial rites. Thus, the most im por tant 
non-gov ern men tal Saudi or gani za tion, the World Mus lim League1 (al-Ra bita 
al-islamiya al-’alamiya), founded in 1962 and whose main func tion is to sup port Mus-
lim mi nori ties from non-Mus lim coun tries, has a re gional Is lamic coun cil for 
Europe (with head quar ters in Lon don) which aims at giv ing fi nan cial sup port to Is-
lamic pro jects (mosque build ing, schools, Mus lim in sti tutes, cul tural pro grammes 
etc.)2. In France in par ticu lar, but also in Spain and It aly, where most Mus lims origi-
nate from Maghreb, Ra bita also faces com pe ti tion from the of fi cial in sti tu tions of 
Maghre bian states (Mo rocco, Al ge ria, Tu ni sia), which in their turn pro pose pro jects 
meant to win the loy alty of their for mer citi zens. For in stance, Al ge ria has long 
been able to se cure some im por tant con trol over a part of France’s Mus lims by es-
tab lish ing a spe cial re la tion ship, ever since the 1950s, with the imams of the Great 
Mosque in Paris (and with the rec tors of the Mus lim In sti tute it hosts). The Great 
Mosque is the most im por tant theo logi cal in sti tu tion of French Is lam, whose re cent 
imams have been Si Hamza Bou bakeur and, af ter 1995, his son Dalil Bou bakeur. 
Usu ally, how ever, the League’s fi nan cial re sources are much lar ger than those of 
such Arab states, which are also im mersed in do mes tic eco nomic and po liti cal dif fi-
cul ties; there fore, Saudi money of ten comes first. The League also co or di nates the 
In ter na tional Coun cil of Mosques, whose role is both to fi nance places of wor ship 
and to co or di nate and con trol them; its Euro pean head quar ters are in Brux elles.
Ra bita is cer tainly not the only source of fi nanc ing and pro mot ing Salafi (or Is-
lamic) pro jects in Europe and across the world. One must also men tion the im por-
tance of other Mus lim bank ing in sti tu tions: the Is lamic De vel op ment Bank 
(founded in 1973 by the Or gani za tion of the Is lamic Con fer ence) but also Dar al 
Mal al-Islami, a pri vate Is lamic bank founded in 1981 with head quar ters in Ge-
neva, and Dalla al-Ba raka, founded in 1982 by a group of Ar abs led by the Saudi bil-
lion aire Salih Ab dal lah Kamil3. With an ini tial capi tal of one bil lion dol lars, the 
bank has grown rap idly and even man aged to en ter the Euro pean mar kets by 
open ing in 1984 the In ter na tional Is lamic Bank in Co pen ha gen, which has be come 
the bank of choice for most Euro pean Mus lims. Some of these fi nan cial in sti tu-
tions have played an im por tant part in trans fer ring pri vate Saudi money to wards 
vari ous Is lamic pro grammes in Paki stan, Europe or the United States. Fi nally, in 
1 www.muslimworldleague.org/mwlwbsite_eng/index.htm (accessed on 05.03.2009).
2 Antoine BASBOURS, L’Arabie Saoudite en question, Perrin, Paris, 2002, p. 147.
3 Stéphanie PARIGI, Des banques islamiques. Argent et religion, Editions Ramsay, Paris, 1989, 
pp. 15-42.
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ad di tion to these in sti tu tions, a se ries of non-gov ern men tal or gani za tions have 
also emerged, the best known of which are the Is lamic Re lief Or gani za tion and the Is-
lamic Re lief Agency, both first func tion ing as links to sup port mu ja he din1 re sis tance 
in Af ghani stan, later di rect ing their at ten tion to wards Bos nia. In the 1990s an im-
por tant role in steer ing pri vate Saudi money to sup port ”the Is lamic fight ers in Pal-
es tine, Bos nia, Af ghani stan, and Al ge ria” is played by the UK Is lamic Mis sion. 
An other im por tant Brit ish as so cia tion, which pro motes Wahhabi in ter ests and 
strives to win the loy alty and fi nan cial sup port of Euro pean Saudis, is the UK Ac-
tion Com mit tee on Is lamic Af fairs. The main prob lem of all these in sti tu tions and as-
so cia tions re mains that of ten a cer tain amount of money is not used for its of fi cial 
pur pose – to sup port Is lamic pro grammes – but rather di rected to wards vari ous 
radi cal move ments. The com plex ity of the so cial mi lieu which ab sorbs fi nan cial re-
sources from the Golf states makes pos si ble such prac tices, given the fact that the 
peo ple in volved can eas ily lean to wards mili tant po si tions. This situa tion, in fact, 
only mir rors the clas si cal am bi gu ity that has for dec ades char ac ter ized Saudi Ara-
bia: a stra te gic ally of the United States, it has at the same time sup ported the Salafi 
cur rent, whose ide ol ogy fu els many con tem po rary radi cal move ments2.
How ever, con tem po rary Salafism has moved be yond the in sti tu tional struc-
ture pro moted and sup ported by pri vate or pub lic Wahhabi agents. It has be come, 
first of all, a ”state of mind” whose visi ble shape is given by vari ous lo cal fig ures, 
less mo ti vated by the co her ent strat egy of some cen tre of power and more by their 
ad her ence to the same mes sage and cul ti va tion of per sonal Inter net-me di ated con-
tacts. Salafism is the per fect ex am ple of a trans-na tional move ment, based on a hori-
zon tal in side-the-net work form of in ter ac tion, with no pre-es tab lished hi er ar chy. In 
Europe, it is char ac ter ized by the strict ob ser vance of Shari’a, the de lib er ate re fusal 
of any po liti cal in volve ment, a strong so cial con trol over its fol low ers (es pe cially 
over women) and the ten dency to keep a dis tance from the sur round ing non-Mus-
lim en vi ron ment. Salafism has fol lowed a logic of the ghetto; more pre cisely, its fol-
low ers at tempt to re it er ate, in a new geo graphi cal con text, the fa mous ”re treat” 
(hi jra) of the Prophet from pa gan Mecca to Me dina, where he founded an au then tic 
Is lamic so ci ety which is taken as the mythi cal ref er ence by all Islamist move ments. 
There fore, this break away with the val ues and so cial struc tures of the West ern 
world is mo ti vated by a prin ci pled re jec tion, on the grounds that such val ues are 
not in keep ing with Is lam. In some cases, Sala fite lead ers have gone so far as to ad-
vise their fol low ers to leave Europe and re turn to their Mus lim home coun tries, 
for fear they might be cor rupted by West ern life styles3. How ever, their aver sion 
against the West does not pre vent Sala fite sup port ers from tak ing ad van tage of its 
tech no logi cal in no va tions: one of the most im por tant char ac ter is tics of those who 
have em braced Islam ism is their use of the Inter net, which be comes a kind of vir-
tual ’Umma, an tici pat ing the hoped for de facto unity of all be liev ers. There are num-
ber less Salafi web sites and blogs, ei ther in Ara bic, Urdu, vari ous Ori en tal dia lects, 
1 Abdel-Rahman GHANDOUR, Jihad humanitaire: Enquête sur les ONG islamiques, 
Flammarion, Paris, 2002.
2 This is the reason why, after September 11, 2001, people like the French analyst of Rand 
Corporation, Laurent Murawiec, have officially denounced the fact that Saudi Arabia supports 
international terrorist networks, and have pleaded for a ”de-saudisation” of the kingdom: La 
Guerre d’après, Albin Michel, Paris, 2003.
3 Samir AMGHAR, ”Le salafisme en Europe: la mouvance polymorphe d’une radicalisation”, 
Politique Étrangère, no. 1, 2006, p. 72.
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or in the Euro pean lan guages. Above all, these are a ma jor in stru ment through 
which Salafi sheyks and preach ers dis semi nate their ca noni cal ad vice among the 
be liev ers and an swer their que ries con cern ing the ob ser vance of Shari’a in the con-
tem po rary world. How ever, such web sites and blogs also rep re sent the most read-
ily avail able op por tu nity for pro mot ing a neo-fun da men tal ist ide ol ogy and 
re cruit ing new fol low ers1. More over, the Inter net be comes a space where peo ple 
and groups can freely criti cize one an other, in terms of theo logi cal po si tions, poli-
tics or un avoid able per sonal ar gu ments.
The Euro pean pene tra tion of Salafi struc tures is a rela tively re cent phe nome-
non, origi nat ing mainly in the foun da tion of Front Is lamic du Sa lut (FIS) in Al ge ria 
in the late 1980s. It quickly spread its in flu ence over the large Al ge rian di as pora 
in France, the main Euro pean cen ter of the Salafi move ment. Al though FIS had a 
prin ci pled ori en ta tion to wards a po liti cal agenda, and even won the lo cal elec-
tions in 1991, the ide ol ogy of one of the move ment’s im por tant wings (the most 
promi nent rep re sen ta tive of which was the popu lar preacher Ali Ben hadj) shared 
Salafism’s rigu rous ap proach, which it ac tu ally at tempted to im ple ment in the 
Al ge rian mi lieus it could in flu ence, es pe cially on the out skirts of the large cit ies. 
The fact that FIS was out lawed in 1992 as well as the sub se quent re pres sion against 
its lead ers trig gered an exo dus of many of them to wards Euro pean coun tries, 
France and Bel gium in par ticu lar. Thus, the foun der of the Salafi move ment in 
France was Ab del-Hadi Dudi, the imam of the al-Sunna al-Ke bira mosque in Mar-
seille and leader of the Salafi wing which would gen er ate FIS (Ab del-Hadi Dudi 
had been ex pelled from Al ge ria in 19872). He would con vert from the old po liti cal 
mili tan tism of FIS to the pie tis tic ori en ta tion of Saudi Shaykist Salafism and be-
come the only au thor ized rep re sen ta tive in France of Rabi al-Madkhali, the fore-
most ca noni cal au thor ity for the French Salafism.
In deed, since the sec ond half of the 1990s the Saudi in flu ence over French 
Salafism has be come es sen tial, es pe cially af ter the new gen era tion of Mus lims, 
edu cated in the Arab Pen in sula, re turn to France, and af ter Saudi mis sion ar ies 
and preach ers open re li gious cen ters in highly popu lated Mus lim neighbour-
hoods. Here they pro mote an in creased ac tiv ism, mainly tar get ing the youth; the 
most im por tant means of dis semi nat ing Salafi prin ci ples are du rus, the study 
groups linked to mosques or places of wor ship. Their imams, of ten self-pro-
claimed, at tract and mo bi lize fol low ers, who are fre quently peo ple that used to 
sup port, but were dis ap pointed by, the clas si cal Islamist move ments, Tabligh and 
the Mus lim Broth er hood. Em brac ing Salafism in volves count less nu ances, as it is 
ul ti mately the ex pres sions of a par ticu lar pri vate ex peri ence. From a so cio logi cal 
per spec tive, how ever, the move ment’s very fo cus on the in di vid ual be liever as 
such makes Salafi Mus lims join pref era bly small groups, of ten con sist ing of peo-
ple who ei ther are rela tives or be long to the same so cial cir cles (friends or even 
band mem bers) and who be lieve they be long to the ”saved sect” (firqa na ji yya). 
This de ci sion to break away from the so cial mi lieu of the ”non-be liev ers” re sults in 
very lit tle pub lic in volve ment and visi bil ity on the part of most Euro pean Sala-
fites, in clear con trast with the in te gra tion ist poli cies of the Mus lim Broth er hood. 
1 http://islam-links.eu/ (accessed on 08.06.2009).
2 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, La France face à ses musulmans: émeutes, jihadisme et 
dépolitisation, Rapport Europe No.172, 9 mars 2006, p. 13, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.
cfm?id=4014&l=2 (accessed on 13.03.2009).
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This in also one of the rea sons why it re mains dif fi cult to ac quire ade quate knowl-
edge of the Sala fite net works and of their mem bers, in ten tions and ac tions1.
Ji hadist Salafism
The tran si tion from pie tis tic to radi cal Salafism is of ten easy, given the fact that 
fol low ers of both share the same Welt an schauung and only dif fer in their meth ods 
and the lim its of their ac tions. Ob vi ously, this shift to wards a mili tant or even vio-
lent po si tion is ac com pa nied by a com plex ra tion ale of jus ti fi ca tion, which in cludes 
ideo logi cal and re li gious mo ti va tions, socio-eco nomic and po liti cal causes and, no 
less im por tantly, the fol low ers’ per sonal his to ries. In Europe, these peo ple have 
vari ous ori gins: first, they are the war vet er ans from Af ghani stan who are mem-
bers, more or less openly, of al-Qaida, GIA, Che chen net works, Is lamic Ji had or 
Gama’al al-Islami yya in Egypt, and who have taken ref uge in Europe. Un der their in-
flu ence, and re spond ing to their prose lyte ac tion, the Mus lim im mi gra tion from 
vari ous Euro pean coun tries has be come radi cal ized, in par ticu lar the young Mus-
lims born in the West who un dergo cri ses of iden tity both in terms of re lig ion and 
cul ture. There are cer tain fa vor ite meth ods for their re cruit ment: in the large cit ies, 
the mosques that have fallen un der Ji hadi in flu ence (Fins bury Park – Londra, 
al-Quds – Ham burg, Chatenay-Malabry – Paris, al-Taw fik – Brux elles), but also the 
fam ily con nec tions or friends, and the Inter net. Pris ons, refu gee cen ters and im mi-
grant aid units are also places where Ji hadi in flu ence can be ex erted and po ten tial 
fol low ers tar geted. The Islamist con ver sion of some de lin quents is one of the most 
wide spread phe nom ena of re cent years, mainly tak ing place in coun tries with a re-
cent Mus lim im mi gra tion such as Spain and It aly. These new im mi grants, usu ally 
com ing from Maghreb, face a much more dif fi cult so cial in te gra tion than the older 
gen era tions of im mi grants, or those born in Europe to im mi grant par ents2.
The un der privi leged mi lieus on the out skirts of the large Euro pean cit ies rep-
re sent im por tant lo ca tions for dis semi nat ing the Salafi mili tan tist ide ol ogy; how-
ever, not all the move ment’s fol low ers origi nate in here. So cial and eco nomic 
rea sons do not pro vide an ex clu sive mo ti va tion for em brac ing Ji hadism and vio-
lent ac tion: a sig nifi cant num ber of radi cal mem bers and fol low ers are re cruited 
from the wealthy and well-edu cated Mus lim popu la tion. In ad di tion to those born 
or per ma nently set tled in Europe, many of them come from the Golf states, and 
their ad her ence to mili tant Salafism is mo ti vated by ideo logi cal com mit ment 
rather than psy cho-so cial cir cum stances. Edu cated in West ern uni ver si ties and/or 
hav ing lived in Europe for some time, fa mil iar with the cul tural codes of mod er-
nity, ac com plished speak ers of sev eral in ter na tional lan guages, these Islamists 
nev er the less ut terly re ject West ern val ues and are most will ing to ap ply their 
cosmopolitism to the ad van tage of trans-na tional net works, which preach a global 
Ji had3. For many of these peo ple, na tional iden tity has lost any rele vance and the 
only valid ref er ence re mains the sense of be long ing to ’Umma, which tran scends 
1 Piotr SMOLAR, ”Mouvance éclatée, le salafisme s’est étendu aux villes moyennes”, Le 
Monde, 22 février 2005.
2 Farhad KHOSROKHAVAR, L’Islam dans les  prisons, Balland, Paris, 2004.
3 IDEM, Les nouveaux martyrs d’Allah, Flammarion, Paris, 2003, pp. 271-301.
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such ”pa gan” cate go ries as state, bor ders, eth nic ity. Aver sion against the axio logi-
cal sys tem of the West, to gether with a be lief in the spiri tual, cul tural and po liti cal 
su pe ri or ity of Is lam, does not in vite a so cial ”re treat” (as Shaykh ist Salafism 
claims) but, on the con trary, calls for con fron ta tion, in keep ing with the his tori cal 
ar che types of the Prophet and the first ca liphs. This sub li mated im agery and vi-
sion of war, which be longs to the Is lamic tra di tion, is ex panded on a global scale. 
There fore, the vari ous fat was, or re li gious de ci sions, is sued by Ji hadi lead ers now 
of fer re li gious le giti mi za tion to acts of ag gres sion against West ern coun tries, 
which are re garded as mere ab strac tions on the bat tle field of an apoca lyp tic imagi-
nary con fron ta tion be tween Is lam and the West. Unlike Islamist at tack ers mo ti-
vated by na tion al ist causes, whose po ten tial vic tims re tain a pre cise iden tity that 
ex plains their very choice as tar gets (the Jews for Hamas or the Is lamic Ji had, the 
Iraqi for Ira nian sui cide bomb ers, the Rus sians for Che chen ter ror ists), Ji hadi Sala-
fites re gard their vic tims as only ”un signe dans une sé mi olo gie ab straite, sans vis-
age spé ci fique. Leur seul carac tère iden ti fi able, c’est d’être des ’Occi den taux’, 
pour la sim ple rai son qu’ils vivent en Oc ci dent”1. The most com pel ling ex am ple 
of this pro to type of the Ji hadi mili tant is pro vided by the per pe tra tors of the ter ror-
ist at tacks of Sep tem ber 11, 2001 and Lon don (2005), many of whom were peo ple 
with a suc cess ful pro fes sional and so cial in te gra tion. The al leged leader of the 
USA at tacks, Mo ham med Atta, be longed to a fairly wealthy Egyp tian fam ily, and 
was him self an ar chi tec ture gradu ate from the Uni ver sity of Cairo. His con ver sion 
to Ji hadi Salafism only took place in Europe, af ter Atta ar rived in Ham burg for 
post-gradu ate stud ies. Dur ing the 1990s he would at tend re li gious ser vices at the 
al-Quds mosque and fall un der the in flu ence of Mo hamed Hay dar Zam mar. An 
Arab-Af ghan war vet eran and promi nent mem ber of al-Qaida in Europe, he was 
to in tro duce Atta to the move ment’s lead ers in Af ghani stan, where the lat ter 
would en rol in sev eral mili tary train ing pro grammes be fore set tling in the USA2.
One more re cent cate gory of sup port ers of the radi cal Islamist ide ol ogy con-
sists of the new con verts, whose rela tively low num bers are com pen sated for by 
their in tense ac tiv ism and by the pub lic im pact trig gered by me dia cov er age both 
in the Mus lim coun tries and in the West. Many of those who em brace mili tant Is-
lam be long to the well-edu cated mid dle-class and are mo ti vated not so much by 
spiri tual as by ideo logi cal rea sons since they re gard Islamist ide ol ogy as the new 
form of anti-es tab lish ment op po si tion, which has re placed the old-fash ioned and 
out dated left ist ide olo gies. More of ten than not, con ver sion is prompted by the in-
flu ence of char is matic fig ures or, as in the case of the young peo ple liv ing on the out-
skirts of Euro pean cit ies (es pe cially in France, where the of fi cial secu lar edu ca tion 
has re sulted in the dis ap pear ance of Chris tian re li gious and cul tural land marks), 
by long prox imity with the Mus lim popu la tion. So cial in ter ac tion some times leads 
to sup port for, and iden ti fi ca tion with, the Is lamic sys tem of val ues or with the po-
liti cal agenda of the Mus lim world. Con ver sions are not al ways to wards radi cal-
ism, when they are me di ated by move ments such as Tabligh or by vari ous imams 
and preach ers that rec om mend pie tis tic Salafism; how ever, just like the Mus lims by 
birth, the new con verts al ways have the op tion to move to wards mili tant ac tiv ism3. 
1 Ibidem, p. 295.
2 Peter FINN, ”Hamburg’s Cauldron of Terror”, Washington Post, September 11, 2002.
3 Juan José Escobar STEMMANN, ”Middle East Salafism’s Influence and Radicalization of 
Muslims Comunities in Europe”, Middle East Rewiew of International Affairs, vol. 10, no. 3, 2006, 
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Some of them even take part in mili tary train ing, and some times con flicts, in Af-
ghani stan, Bos nia, Chech nya or, more re cently, Iraq – the new ji hadi El Do rado. 
Apart from the zeal that char ac ter izes all the new fol low ers of a re lig ion, Is lam con-
verts bring the ad di tional ad van tage that, due to their West ern ori gin, they can be 
more eas ily used for ac tions tak ing place in Europe.
Ji hadi Salafism is mainly fo cused on three ma jor geo po liti cal pro jects: (a) the 
fight against the Mus lim rul ing pow ers, re garded as il le giti mate be cause they 
have failed to up hold Is lamic as pi ra tions (the Ji hadi move ments in Al ge ria, Egypt, 
Paki stan, Syria and more re cently Saudi Ara bia, Mo rocco, Iraq); (b) the fight to lib-
er ate for mer Mus lim ter ri to ries, now in hab ited by non-be liev ers or tol er at ing the 
pres ence of their mili tary forces (Anda lu sia, the Bal kans, the Cau ca sus, Kash mir, 
Saudi Ara bia, Iraq, Pal es tine etc.); (c) the pur suit of a global ji had in view of a com-
plete islamisa tion of all hu man kind.
The ideo logi cal roots of Ji hadism are mainly to be found in the works of Say-
yid Qutb (1906-1966), a mem ber of Mus lim Broth er hood whom Nas ser’s re gime 
mur dered in prison. He be lieved that al most the en tire con tem po rary world, in-
clud ing the coun tries which called them selves Mus lim, were il le giti mate with re-
gard to the de mands of the true Is lam. Qutb de scribed this state as jā hili yya (the 
age of ig no rance and bar ba rism), em ploy ing the word that, in the Is lamic tra di tion, 
was used to re fer to the pe riod be fore the com ing of the Prophet. In con trast, hā ki mi-
yya, ”Al lah’s ex clu sive po liti cal sov er eignty”, was il lus trated by the Is lamic state 
that im ple mented and se cured a strict ob ser vance of Shari’a1. Jā hili yya de scribed 
the con di tion of the mod ern world, in clud ing Mus lim coun tries, in which laws and 
gov ern ments were no longer founded on the di vine Law (Shari’a) and in which 
peo ple had usurped the di vine sov er eignty. This had been re placed by a hu man 
secu lar sov er eignty, by the ar bi trari ness of hu man laws and sys tems of gov ern-
ment which had no ground ing in the tran scen dent. Hā ki mi yya rep re sented the re-
turn to hu man kind’s true con di tion, as il lus trated in the so ci ety built by the Prophet 
and his first fol low ers. At that time, gov ern ing was done in the name of God and 
ac cord ing to his com mand ments by a truly Mus lim emir and not, as Qutb thought 
it was the case in con tem po rary times, by a des pot – the ”Pharaon” (an ob vi ous ref-
er ence to Nas ser, but also to all the law less Mus lim rul ers who had aban doned Tra-
di tion), rul ing as he pleased2. The ma jor con se quence of Qutb’s di chot omy be tween 
hāki mi yya and jā hili yya was that it seemed to le giti mize the Holy War – as a re bel-
lion or a revo lu tion – not only against non-Mus lim pow ers (the clas si cal un der-
stand ing of Ji had) but also against the Mus lim gov ern ments that were deemed 
il le giti mate (kufr). These gov ern ments could fall un der an anath ema (tak fir), the su-
preme ac cu sa tion in Is lam, which trig gered the con se quence that the ac cused was 
ex cluded from the com mu nity, from ’Umma3. In its ju ridi cal sense, tak fir, the ex com-
mu ni ca tion of a Mus lim, meant that ”spill ing his blood be came law ful”, i.e. it was 
al lowed to kill that per son. Thus, Qutb sug gested that he le giti mized re bel lion 
against ty rant Mus lim rul ers (tāghāt), the main tar get be ing, of course, Nas ser.
pp. 1-14, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue3/Escobar.pdf (accessed on 20.02.2009). 
1 William SHEPARD, ”Sayyid Qutb’s Doctrine of ’Jāhiliyya’”, International Journal of Middle 
East Studies, vol. 35, no. 4, 2003, pp. 521-545.
2 Gilles KEPEL, Le Prophète et le Pharaon. Aux sources des mouvements islamistes, Le Seuil, 
Paris, 1993.
3 Abderahim LAMCHICHI, Géopolitique de l’islamisme, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2001, p. 74.
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Qutb’s in flu ence has been enor mous in the whole Mus lim world, es pe cially 
af ter his works have been ex ten sively pub lished by his fol low ers who took ref uge 
in Saudi Ara bia. Al though not his en tire think ing has been em braced by all con-
tem po rary Salafi move ments, Qutb has pro vided the theo reti cal frame work that 
jus ti fies vio lence against the rul ing pow ers, in ob vi ous dis agree ment with the 
Sunni tra di tion which tends to le giti mize any po liti cal au thor ity on con di tion that 
it is not guilty of apos tasy. To day Tak fir ism, which es sen tially origi nates in Qutb’s 
vi sion, repre sents one of the ma jor lines of Sala fite think ing and ac tion. It is rep re-
sented by groups and in di vidu als who be lieve that para mount im por tance should 
be given to the bat tle against mod er ate Mus lim lead ers (who are ac cused of break-
ing Is lamic laws or of co op er at ing with il le giti mate pow ers) and even against any 
Mus lim whose com mit ment to re li gious val ues does not seem strong enough. In 
the 1990s Tak fir ism is mainly il lus trated by the Egyp tian or gani za tions Tan zim 
al-Ji had and Jama’at al-Islamiya (which be come in volved in vio lent ac tions against 
Egyp tian lead ers, in par ticu lar presi dent Mou ba rak)1 and by the radi cal Al ge rian 
move ments that emerge dur ing the civil war and are gen eri cally known as Groupe 
Armé Islami que (GIA). How ever, at the be gin ning of the 1990s Tak firi prin ci ples 
are also em braced by Ben Laden and some radi cal Saudi ule mas op posed to the 
power in Ri yadh, who later take ref uge in Lon don. Con tem po rary Tak fir ism, al-
though dis play ing less or gan iza tional visi bil ity, still re mains pre sent in many 
Mus lim coun tries; it has been res ur rected by al-Zarkawi, the her ald of an Is lamic 
so ci ety pu ri fied of il le giti mate rul ers and here tic doc trines. One of the best-known 
Euro pean sup port ers of Tak firi ide ol ogy has been Abu Qatada al-Filastini, a Pal es-
tin ian ulema trained in al-Qaida camps in Paki stan, who sought ref uge in Lon don 
in 1993. He be lieves that Ji had should first be di rected against the apos tati cal po-
liti cal re gimes in the Mus lim world, which are to be de throned and re placed by 
Is lamic states based on Shari’a; only later should the mili tary zeal tar get the 
West2. With out join ing any visi ble Islamist or gani za tion, Abu Qatada has been 
one of the most in flu en tial theo rists of Ji hadi Salafism, with a con sid er able au thor-
ity over the radi cal Maghre bian move ments, es pe cially the in ter na tional Salafi 
wing of GIA, which le giti mizes its vio lence against ci vil ians by in vok ing his fat-
was pub lished in the move ment’s Euro pean bul le tin, al-An sar. Af ter Sep tem ber 
11, 2001, Abu Qatada has re peat edly been ar rested by the Brit ish au thori ties and 
is now in de ten tion.
The most im por tant event, which has in flu enced the whole de vel op ment of 
the ide olo gies and ac tions of radi cal Is lamic move ments, has un doubt edly been 
the war in Af ghani stan. Through out the 1980s it has be come the fa vor ite ”cause” 
of the mili tant and com bat ive as pi ra tions of the whole Mus lim world, re plac ing 
even the tra di tional Pal es tin ian is sue. More than 35 000 vol un teers join the Af ghan 
mu ja hedins be tween 1982 and 1992; they be long to 43 coun tries in the Mid dle 
East, North Af rica, Cen tral and South-East ern Asia. These ji hadi fight ers, also 
known as ”Arab-Af ghans”, have been ex posed to Salafi ideo logi cal in doc tri na tion 
and re ceived mili tary train ing ei ther in the units of the Af ghan Islamist par ties or 
1 David ZEIDAN, ”Radical Islam in Egypt: A Comparison of Two Groups”, Middle East 
Review of International Affairs, vol. 3, no. 3, 1999, pp. 1-10, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue3/
zeidan.pdf (accessed on 12.02.2009).
2 Dominique THOMAS, Le Londonistan: Le djihad au coeur de l’Europe, Editions Michalon, 
Paris, 2005, p. 103.
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in the new cen ters opened at the Af ghan-Paki stani bor der by the Is lamic World 
League or other Saudi or gani za tions, later to be brought to gether as the ”Af ghan 
Bu reau” (Mak htab al-Khīd mat) led by Ab dul lah Az zam. He is also one of the main 
ide olo gists of Ji hadism, be liev ing that the ji had ini ti ated by Mus lim fight ers 
should not only aim at lib er at ing Af ghani stan but also at free ing all the Mus lim ter-
ri to ries in hab ited by ”non-be liev ers”. This ”global ji had” will later be come the leit-
mo tiv of a whole gen era tion of Islamist mili tants origi nat ing in Af ghani stan, who 
at tempt to glob al ize the holy war by im pos ing a uni ver sal Mus lim rule in the Mus-
lim coun tries as well as the West, the lat ter be com ing, af ter the USSR is de feated, 
the new en emy of the Mus lim world1.
The re treat of the So viet army from Af ghani stan, the sus pen sion of fi nan cial 
and mili tary aid from Saudi Ara bia, the pref er ence of Paki stani lead ers for cer tain 
Af ghan Islamist groups and the ri valry within mu ja he din re sis tance it self are the 
rea sons that have led to a re-think ing of the strat egy of al-Qaida and of the 
Arab-Af ghan fight ers based in Af ghani stan and Paki stan. Later on, the Golf war 
trig gers a clear di vi sion within the Salafi move ment: Ben Laden, as well as the 
Islamist lead ers and or gani za tions that sup port him, now com pletely dis avow 
the Saudi mon ar chy be cause it has al lowed for eign troops in the Arab Pen in sula. 
Pre vi ous to this move ment, Ri yadh used to be at the fore front of the in ter na tional 
ac tions of sup port for Sunni Islamist move ments and the main fi nancer of Af-
ghan ji had. Ben Laden’s dis tanc ing him self from Saudi lead ers clearly in di cates 
the dif fer ent paths that the two Salafi cur rents are to fol low. Saudi Ara bia con tin-
ues to pro mote a pie tis tic Salafism (anti-po liti cal and anti-vio lent, fo cused on 
predi ca tion and con trol of be hav iour) while pro tect ing its re la tion ship with the 
West. On the con trary, al-Qaida and the other radi cal Salafi move ments up hold 
pri mar ily mili tary ac tion as the best method to im ple ment an Is lamic or der or, at 
least, to dis rupt the cur rent West ern one. Dur ing this ideo logi cal and stra te gic 
shift, an im por tant role has been played by the Egyp tian mem bers of al-Qaida, es-
pe cially Ay man al-Zawa hiri2. In the sec ond half of the 1990s, af ter al-Qaida’s in-
fra struc ture is pri mar ily lo cated in Af ghani stan, al-Zawa hiri ar ticu lates the most 
im por tant char ac ter is tics of the move ment: (1) the de vel op ment of the con cepts 
of “near en emy” (lo cal Mus lim re gimes) and “dis tant en emy” (first of all, Is rael 
and the United States) and the ne ces sity to re place Tak fir ism by ac tive fight ing 
against the non-Mus lims (hence the sup port Ben Laden pro vides for GIA, which 
op poses the Tak firi move ment); (2) the re jec tion of the tra di tional Is lamic view 
that Jews and Chris tians are “peo ple of the Book”, re li gious dif fer ence be ing now 
used for po liti cal and xeno pho bic pur poses; (3) the idea of a ”global ji had” (vio-
lent ac tions are no longer re stricted to spe cific geo graphic ar eas but ex pand glob-
ally to all places where West ern in ter ests can be harmed); (4) the shift from 
guer rilla fight ing (as it was the case in Af ghani stan, Bos nia, Chech nya, So ma lia) 
to ur ban ter ror ism which tar gets sym boli cal ob jec tives3. Ul ti mately, how ever, the 
ter ror ism em braced by the al-Qaida lead ers seems a sign of their in abil ity to act 
1 Gilles KEPEL, ”Terrorisme islamiste: de l’anticommunisme au jihad anti-américain”, 
Ramses, 2003, pp. 43-58, http://www.ifri.org/files/RAMSES_2003/RAMSES_03_Kepel.pdf (accessed 
on 18.02.2009).
2 Jason BURKE, Al-Qaida. La véritable histoire de l’Islam radical, La Découverte, Paris, 2003.
3 Benjamin ORBACH, „Usama bin Laden and al-Qa’ida: Origins and Doctrines”, Middle 
East Rewiew of International Affairs, vol. 5, no. 4, 2001, pp. 54-68, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/
issue4/jv5n4a3.htm (accessed on 18.02.2009).
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. IX • no. 4 • 2009
702 MARIUS I. LAZĂR
po liti cally in or der to achieve their goals, as they rather un re al is ti cally en vis age 
the po liti cal unity of the Mus lim world un der the lead er ship of a ca liph and the 
re moval of West ern he gem ony over the Mus lim coun tries. Al-Qaida ter ror ism is 
yet an other ex am ple of what Oliver Ray has la belled ”un fon da men tal isme sun-
nite en panne de pro jet politique”1.
In ad di tion to its own net work, con sist ing of for mer Arab-Af ghan fight ers as 
well as sub se quently re cruited fol low ers, al-Qaida has of ten at tempted to en rol un-
der its flag vari ous other Islamist move ments. It has ei ther se cured their vol un tary 
ad her ence to its suc cess ful brand name or in fil trated al-Qaida mem bers among 
the sup port ers of other Islamist move ments, thereby steer ing them to wards po si-
tions more in keep ing with its in ter ests and prin ci ples. This is mostly a pro ject of 
ac tion and ide ol ogy which al-Qaida lead ers de liver to their fol low ers around the 
world by means of mass me dia, and es pe cially the Inter net2 (this pro ject is ad-
justed to lo cal speci fici ties, like a fran chise, by vari ous groups or in di vidu als who 
have been drawn to al-Qaida’s mes sage). Con tem po rary Ji hadism, in the West as 
well as the Mus lim world, con sists of a large va ri ety of cur rents, groups and strate-
gies, only some of which are di rectly linked to al-Qaida3. A de ci sive role has been 
played here by Arab-Af ghan vet er ans, the first gen era tion of the new Ji hadi Salafi 
cur rent, peo ple whose evo lu tion, in ter-per sonal re la tion ships, loy al ties to al-Qaida 
lead ers or at least to their ide ol ogy and strate gies rep re sent the main sources of the 
emer gence of the new Ji hadi move ments around the world. Some of these vet er-
ans re main close to al-Qaida lead ers, fol low ing them to Saudi Ara bia, Su dan and 
then Af ghani stan again, af ter 1996. Oth ers be come ”no mad” Ji hadi fight ers, mak-
ing their pres ence felt in the new con flicts which take place on the fringes of the 
Mus lim world and to which they at tempt to lend a re li gious di men sion: Chech-
nya, Bos nia, So ma lia, Su dan, Tad ji ki stan, Kash mir and, more re cently, Iraq. Yet oth-
ers choose to re turn to their home coun tries where, ha loed by the glory of hav ing 
taken part in the anti-so viet ji had and im mersed in Salafi ide ol ogy, will make a de-
ci sive con tri bu tion to a radi cali za tion of lo cal Islam ism, as it has been the case in 
Al ge ria and Egypt. Here they at tempt to ini ti ate lo cal ji hads di rected against the 
po liti cal el ites (re garded as il le giti mate) and pos si bly to start an in sur gence that 
will bring to power Is lamic re gimes. The fail ure of this vio lent Islamist strat egy, 
the au thori ties’ mas sive re pres sion against Ji hadi fight ers as well as the dif fi cul ties 
en coun tered by most Arab-Af ghan vet er ans in their ef forts to in te grate so cially 
into their home coun tries will trig ger a new hi jra, a new ”emi gra tion” (hence the 
name they call them selves – mu ha jiroun, emi grants). Some of these peo ple emi-
grate to the West (Europe or the United States), which could of fer them not only 
per sonal safety but also many more op por tu ni ties to com mu ni cate, to re cruit fol-
low ers from within the Mus lim com mu ni ties, and es pe cially to es tab lish fi nan cial 
net works that could sup port fur ther vio lent ac tion.
1 Olivier ROY, ”Un fondamentalisme sunnite en panne de projet politique”, Le Monde 
Diplomatique, octobre 1998, p. 9.
2 Hanna ROGAN, Jihadism Online – A Study of How al-Qaida and Radical Islamist Groups Use 
the Internet for Terrorist Purposes, FFI Rapport 2006/00915, http://rapporter.ffi.no/
rapporter/2006/00915.pdf (accessed on 11.02.2009). 
3 Petter NESSER, Jihad in Europe. A Survey of the Motivations for Sunni Islamist Terrorism in 
Post-millennium Europe, FFI Rapport 2004/01146, http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2004/01146.pdf 
(accessed on 11.02.2009). 
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The Ji hadists Net works in Europe
The emer gence of radi cal Salafism in Europe in the 1990s has there fore been 
the re sult of two Islamist phe nom ena, which origi nated in the Mus lim world but 
whose in flu ence has re ver ber ated in Europe as well. The first event is the exo dus of 
a cer tain num ber of Af ghan Ji hadi fight ers to Europe (ei ther as refu gees from their 
home coun tries or af ter they also spent some time in volved in com bat in Bos nia, 
Chech nya etc.)1. The sec ond source of the ex pan sion of Sala fite net works in Europe 
is the Al ge rian civil war dur ing the 1990s. Given the large Al ge rian di as pora in 
West ern coun tries, par ticu larly in France (more than three mil lion), the po liti cal un-
rest, ideo logi cal cur rents and vari ous changes that have af fected Al ge ria along the 
dec ades have un avoid ably im pacted the Al ge rian popu la tion liv ing abroad. As a re-
sult, the in crease in the in flu ence of Islamist move ments dur ing the 1980s (which 
cul mi nates with the un ion of vari ous groups and cur rents in Front Islami que du Sa-
lut (FIS)) is equally visi ble among the Al ge rian popu la tion set tled in Europe. The 
an nul ment by the po liti cal and mili tary lead ers of the elec tion re sults of Janu ary 
1992, which pro claimed FIS the win ner of the gen eral elec tions, the out law ing of 
the Front and the ar rest of its lead ers have led to the radi cali za tion of a part of the 
mem bers and sup port ers of the Al ge rian Islamist move ment. They give up any po-
liti cal strat egy to win power (which has be come an im pos si bil ity) and choose in-
stead vio lent ac tion di rected, in prin ci ple, against the au thori ties but which has 
of ten re sulted along the years in the mas sa cre of ci vil ian popu la tion2.
Sev eral radi cal move ments emerged af ter 1992, which were led by vari ous 
”emirs” (with one na tional ”emir” rec og nized by all the re gional ones) and which 
came to be known gen eri cally as Groupe Islami que Armé (GIA). They em braced Salafi 
prin ci ples, be came in volved in mu tual con tes ta tion and bloody con flicts, and per-
pe trated par ox ys tic vio lence which, al though given a re li gious jus ti fi ca tion by ule-
mas such as al-Qatada, was ac tu ally mo ti vated rather by patho logi cal ag gres sive ness. 
En gaged in an open con flict with the Al ge rian au thori ties, GIA (al though of ten in fil-
trated among the mem bers of the se cu rity ser vices) ended up ex pand ing its ac tions 
out side the coun try. Net works of fi nan cial sup port, arm traf fic and propa ganda were 
im ple mented within the Al ge rian com mu ni ties in vari ous Euro pean coun tries, es-
pe cially in France3. How ever, af ter 1994 the French au thori ties pur sued an ef fi cient 
pol icy of eradi cat ing GIA mem bers and sup port ers, more so in the wake of the at-
tacks on the Paris metro (1995). With out be ing openly claimed by GIA, these at tacks 
were, how ever, the re sult of a de ci sion taken by the new na tional ”emir”, Dja mal Zi-
touni, to ex pand ji had on French ter ri tory in the hope that his ac tion would per-
suade France to with draw sup port for the Al ge rian state, thereby weak en ing it4. 
The prompt re pres sive re ac tion of the French of fi cials, as well as the pub lic dis-
avowal of the at tacks by most Is lamic or gani za tions in France led to the dis so lu-
tion of the French GIA net works. These were mainly lo cated in Paris, Lyon and 
1 Evan F. KOHLMANN, ”The Afghan-Bosnian Mujahideen Network in Europe”, 2006, 
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/06/cats_paper_the_afghanbosnian_m.php (accessed on 
08.03.2009). 
2 Séverine LABAT, Les islamistes algériens. Entre les urnes et le maquis, Seuil, Paris, 1995.
3 CENTER FOR POLICING TERRORISM, Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) Dossier, http://www.
cpt-mi.org/pdf/GIADossierv4.pdf (accessed on 13.03.2009).
4 Hassane ZERROUKY, La nébuleuse islamiste en France et en Algérie, Edition 1, Paris, 2002.
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Lille and con sisted of mili tants that had pur pose fully come from Al ge ria as well 
as young Mus lims re cruited from the un der privi leged neighbour hoods on the out-
skirts of French cit ies. Some of the French mem bers of GIA would be ar rested 
while oth ers would seek ref uge in other Euro pean coun tries, Bel gium, It aly, Den-
mark, Swit zer land and es pe cially Great Brit ain1.
In Al ge ria, GIA was to lose more and more of its sup port ers and mem bers, 
and to wards the late 1990s com pletely dis ap peared. A sig nifi cant part of the Al ge-
rian Islamist move ment ac cepted the peace agree ment of fered by the au thori ties 
and gradu ally ceased vio lent ac tion. How ever, some GIA mem bers would in te grate 
into a new Salafi struc ture, which emerged par ticu larly as a re sult of the ef forts 
made by Ben Laden and al-Qaida lead ers to steer Al ge rian vio lence away from a radi-
cal Tak fir ism that tar geted ci vil ians to wards a bat tle against the Al ge rian gov ern-
ment and West ern in ter ests. The new or gani za tion, known as the Sala fite Group for 
Preach ing and Com bat (SGPC), would be led by Hasan Hat tab, a for mer leader of 
GIA net works in Europe. Now an al-Qaida sup porter, Hat tab would per suade his 
Euro pean fol low ers (es pe cially in France, Bel gium and Eng land) to serve the or-
gani za tion; thus an Euro pean strat egy, in ad di tion to the Al ge rian one, be came a 
part of the new move ment. Dur ing the anti-ter ror ist cam paign ini ti ated by the 
Euro pean coun tries af ter Sep tem ber 11, 2001, doz ens of SGPC mem bers would be 
ar rested and their cells dis solved. They had in tended sev eral at tacks on Euro pean 
and Ameri can tar gets, such as the ca the dral in Stras bourg2. How ever, the dis agree-
ments be tween Hat tab and al-Qaida lead ers, and Hat tab’s re fusal en tirely to sub-
mit SGPC to al-Qaida con trol and in ter ests would re sult in his los ing power at the 
hands of the Al ge rian mili tants who had re turned from Af ghani stan af ter the fall 
of the Tali ban re gime. Hat tab would be re placed by Na bil Sah raou, who on Sep-
tem ber 11, 2003 would of fi cially pledge obe di ence to al-Qaida. The strat egy of the 
new ”emir”, Ab del malek Drouk del, seemed to be fo cused es pe cially on vio lent ac-
tions per pe trated in Europe, par ticu larly in France3.
SGPC paves the way for the emer gence of a new gen era tion of Sala fite groups 
in Maghreb, con sist ing mainly of for mer al-Qaida mem bers who take ref uge from 
Af ghani stan af ter the fall of the Tali ban re gime: the Is lamic Mo roc can Com bat 
Group, the Tu ni sian Com bat Group, the Lib yan Is lamic Fight ing Group4. For all 
these or gani za tions, na tional iden tity be comes al most non-ex is tent, be ing re placed 
by a ge neric Is lamic iden tity; they re cruit their fol low ers al most ex clu sively from 
un der privi leged of ten de lin quency-prone mi lieus, and di rect po ten tially anti-so-
cial ac tions to wards Islamist pur poses. All these or gani za tions re ceive mili tary and 
fi nan cial sup port from al-Qaida, es pe cially af ter its change of strat egy in the wake 
of the Sep tem ber 11 USA at tacks. Al-Qaida lead ers now fo cus on an in creased in-
volve ment in the lo cal net works of Islamist move ments, in par ticu lar those close 
to, or within, Europe, which are in re turn granted the privi lege of be ing openly ac-
knowl edged as al-Qaida branches. The new strat egy is known as the doc trine of a 
1 Lia BRYNJAR, Åshild KJØK, Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and their Host 
States – the Case of the Algerian GIA in Europe 1993-2000, FFI Rapport 2001/03789, Forsvarets 
Forskningsinstitutt, http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2001/03789.pdf (accessed on 13.03.2009). 
2 Jason BURKE, Al-Qaida...cit., p. 239.
3 François GÈZE, Salima MELLAH, ”Al-Qaida au Maghreb, ou la très étrange histoire du 
GSPC algérien”, Algeria-Watch, 22 septembre 2007, http://www.algeria-watch.org/pdf/pdf_fr/gspc_
etrange_histoire.pdf (accessed on 16.03.2009).
4 Mathieu GUIDÈRE, Al-Qaida à la conquête du Maghreb, Editions du Rocher, Paris, 2007.
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”de cen tral ized Ji had”, as cribed to Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, the lat est lead ing al-Qaida 
ide olo gist who has emerged from ”the third salafi-ji hadist gen era tion”1. All the 
new Maghre bian Salafi move ments have im por tant Euro pean cells, which are used 
as sanc tu ar ies for their mem bers (origi nat ing in Arab coun tries) who are threat-
ened by state re pres sion, as well as cen ters for pro mot ing their ide ol ogy and ac-
tions across Europe2. The Mo roc can Com bat Group, which au thored the sui ci dal 
at tacks of May 16, 2003, in Casa blanca, is sus pected of also be ing be hind the Ma-
drid at tacks of March 11, 20043. In fact, al-Qaida and these new move ments are 
very suc cess ful in their re cruit ment ef forts in Spain and It aly, coun tries with a 
large clan des tine Maghre bian im mi gra tion. The new gen era tions set tled or born 
here do not feel any par ticu lar loy alty to wards the cul tural and socio-po liti cal 
Euro pean val ues, but rather find a so lu tion to their frus tra tions and ex is ten tial con-
fu sion in the trans na tional Sala fite ide ol ogy4.
France pro gram mati cally pur sued a pol icy of re strict ing mili tant and radi cal 
ac tiv ism for fear that it might in volve the French Mus lim popu la tion, in par ticu lar 
the youth in un der privi leged neighbour hoods, in vio lent ac tions against the so cial 
or der and pub lic se cu rity. How ever, in other Euro pean states (such as Great Brit-
ain and the Scan di na vian coun tries) Islamist mem bers and or gani za tions from the 
en tire Mus lim world would find, un til the Sep tem ber 11 at tacks, a great free dom 
of speech and ac tion. Some of the radi cal Egyp tian lead ers flee ing the re pres sion 
of Mou ba rak’s re gime, as well as GIA mem bers, would set tle in Swe den and Den-
mark, coun tries with a long tra di tion of grant ing asy lum to po liti cal refu gees and 
to all those suf fer ing dis crimi na tion. GIA mem bers would pub lish here the move-
ment’s bul le tin, al-An sar, mostly writ ten by Islamist ide olo gists liv ing in Lon don5. 
In fact, through out the 1990s the Euro pean cen ter of Islam ism would be the Brit ish 
capi tal – hence the name, al ready be come a clas sic, of ”Lon doni stan”. Tak ing ad-
van tage of the un par al leled per mis sive ness of Brit ish leg is la tion con cern ing the 
grant ing of the right of resi dence to po liti cal refu gees, large num bers of lead ers 
and mem bers of the most di verse Islamist groups and cur rents would set tle in 
Great Brit ain. More than 30 op po si tion move ments origi nat ing in the Mus lim 
world used Lon don as a ba sis for com mu ni ca tion and fi nan cial sup port. This was 
also due to the fact that, given its ad van ta geous global fi nan cial po si tion, Lon don 
1 Murad AL-SHISHANI, ”Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and the Third Generation of Salafi-Jihadists”, 
Terrorism Monitor, vol. 3, no. 16, 2005, pp. 1-4; Lia BRYNJAR, ”Al-Suri’s Doctrines for Decentralized 
Jihadi Training”, Terrorism Monitor, vol. 5, no. 1-2, 2007, pp. 1-4; Paul CRUICKSHANK, Mohannad 
HAGE ALI, ”Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 
vol. 30, no. 1, 2007, pp. 1-14. 
2 Saïd HADDAD, ”Le jihadisme au Maghreb: vers la fin des exceptions algérienne et 
marocaine?”, in Jean-Luc MARRET (dir.), Les fabriques du Jihad, PUF, Paris, 2005, pp. 215-240. 
3 Jean-Luc MARRET, Les réseaux jihadistes marocains: entre devenir politique du Maroc et Europe, 
Notes de la Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Octobre 2005, http://www.frstrategie.
org/barreCompetences/secuInterieureTerrorisme/reseaux_jihadistes_marocains.pdf (accessed 
on 20.03.2009).
4 Javier JORDAN, Nicola HORSBURGH, ”The Jihadist Subculture of Terrorism in Spain”, 
in Jonathon E. LYNCH, Gary WHEELER (eds.), Cultures of Violence, Inter-Disciplinary Press, 
Oxford, 2005, pp. 181-194, www.inter-disciplinary.net/ati/violence/v5/horsburgh%20paper.pdf 
(accessed on 20.03.2009).
5 Ǻke SANDER, ”Muslims in Sweden”, in Muhammad ANWAR, Jochen BLASCHKe, Ǻke 
SANDER, State Policies Towards Muslim Minorities: Sweden, Great Britain and Germany, Edition 
Parabolis, Berlin, 2004, pp. 218-223.
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was the place where many pet ro dol lars from the Golf states were di rected, and 
which at tracted the great in ves tors of the Arab world. The City of Lon don hosted 
the Euro pean branches of Arab banks such as Dar al-Mali al-Islami and al-Ba raka, as 
well as those of the Mus lim World League and of many chari ties, all of which op er-
ated with enor mous sums of money world wide. Be sides, Lon don be came the 
world capi tal of Arab press and pub lish ing houses, sur pass ing even the tra di-
tional cen ters, Cairo and Bei rut. Most of the Arab daily news pa pers and pe ri odi-
cals that cir cu lated in ter na tion ally were pub lished in the Brit ish capi tal; in ad di tion 
to these, there were many other pub li ca tions is sued by vari ous or gani za tions and 
cur rents in the Mus lim world, ei ther le gal or dis si dent.
Lon don’s cos mo poli tan en vi ron ment al lowed the co-ex is tence of na tion al ist 
Islamist lead ers of the Egyp tian radi cal move ments, the vari ous Iraq par ties op-
posed to Sad dam’s re gime, FIS and GIA mem bers ex pelled or tak ing ref uge from 
France and the most im por tant ide olo gists and ac tiv ists of Euro pean Ji hadism. A 
promi nent rep re sen ta tive of the last cate gory was Abu Hamza al-Masri, for mer 
mu ja he din in Af ghani stan and Bos nia, who since 1996 has con trolled the sec ond 
larg est mosque in Lon don (Fins bury Park) and made a de ci sive con tri bu tion to 
the radi cali za tion of some of its con gre ga tion1. Omar Bakri Mo ham med was an-
other high-pro file West ern Islamists, some times re garded as al-Qaida’s spokes-
man in Europe, who founded a trans na tional or gani za tion, Hara kat al-Mu ha jiroun 
(the Emi grants’ Move ment), with branches in Europe, the Mid dle East and North 
Af rica2. While of fi cially aim ing at pro tect ing the in ter ests of Brit ish Mus lims, the 
or gani za tion ac tu ally pur sued the ide ol ogy and goals of the older Islamist party 
Hizb ut-Tahrir (the Is lamic Party of Lib era tion), a trans na tional move ment which 
emerged in the Mid dle East in the 1960s and ar gued for the for ma tion of a large ca-
liph ate that was to unite the whole Mus lim world and dis solve na tional states3. 
Bring ing to gether Arab-Af ghan vet er ans as well as other fol low ers in the en tire 
Arab-Mus lim re gion, al-Mu ha jiroun added to the clas si cal Hizb ide ol ogy an es sen-
tial ji hadist di men sion, il lus trated through vari ous ac tions of sup port for the Mus-
lim cause in con flict zones and through in volve ment in in ter na tional ter ror ist 
net works. Apart from Abu Qatada al-Fil istini (men tioned above), an other im por-
tant fig ure of Lon doni stan was Yasser al-Sirri. In 1996 he founded the Is lamic Ob ser-
va tory Cen ter, which func tioned pri mar ily as a pub lic plat form for giv ing voice to 
the vari ous Islamist cur rents in the Mus lim world, in par ticu lar those in Egypt.
How ever, af ter Sep tem ber 11, 2001, the Brit ish pol icy to wards Islamist lead ers 
and move ments in Great Brit ain has be come much less ac com mo dat ing. In fact, 
the new anti-ter ror ist strat egy be gins in May 2000 when the Ter ror ist Act 2000 is 
passed (later to be rec ti fied, in March 2001), which bans ver bal, fi nan cial and mili-
tary sup port for ter ror ist or gani za tions. As yet the law has its limi ta tions, since it 
mostly tar gets the large radi cal na tion al ist Islamist move ments and fo cuses less on 
re strict ing trans na tional Salafi net works. It is passed in re sponse to the pres sure 
1 Yotam FELDNER, ”Profiles islamiques radicaux (1) – Londres – Abou Hamza Al-Masri”, 
Enquêtes et analyses – no. 72, Octobre 2001, http://www.memri.org/bin/french/articles.cgi?Page
=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA7201 (accessed on 24.03.2009).
2 Maureen COFFLARD, L’Emir, Fayard, Paris, 2004. 
3 Zeyno BARAN (ed.), The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical 
Islamist Ideology, Nixon Center, Washington, 2004, http://www.nixoncenter.org/Program%20Briefs/
PB%202004/confrephiztahrir.pdf (accessed on 24.03.2009).
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from coun tries di rectly af fected by Islamist vio lence (the USA, Egypt, In dia, Is rael). 
How ever, Lon don con tin ues to de cline the ex pul sion of Islamist mili tants charged 
with ter ror ist acts, such as the Al ge rian Rashid Ramda, leader of the GIA net works 
from abroad, a sus pect in the 1995 ter ror ist at tacks in Paris. It is only af ter the Sep-
tem ber 11 at tacks that the Anti-ter ror ism, Crime and Se cu rity Act 2001 is passed, 
which al lows the ar rest of any for eigner who is sus pected of en dan ger ing na tional 
se cu rity1. This law has led to re strict ing the me dia, fi nan cial and mili tant ac tivi ties 
of Brit ish Islamist move ments, and some of their lead ers have been ar rested af ter 
2002 (Abu Hamza, al-Qatada, Yasser al-Sirri, vari ous Al ge rian Ji hadists) or ex-
pelled (Omar Bakri Mu ham mad, 2005). How ever, the meas ures taken against the 
high-pro file rep re sen ta tives of Brit ish Islam ism have not brought to an end the in-
flu ence of Ji hadi ide ol ogy among the Mus lim popu la tions in Great Brit ain. Some 
mem bers of the com mu nity have cho sen se crecy and a so cial mi metism that could 
ren der them less con spicu ous to the au thori ties; other have pre ferred re lo cat ing in 
the north of Eng land, or even in Ire land, re gions un der less se cu rity sur veil lance 
than the large cit ies in the south2.
The Lon don un der ground at tacks of July 7 and 21, 2005 were per pe trated by 
the new gen era tion of Islamists, re cruited from among those per suaded by the radi-
cal teach ings of such well-known Lon doni stan ide olo gists as Abu Hamza. Some of 
the at tack ers had a suc cess ful so cial and pro fes sional in te gra tion, which did not pre-
vent their ad her ence to the con cep tual and ex is ten tial ide ol ogy of Salafism. It is a 
char ac ter is tic of many Salafi Ji hadists in volved in at tacks (sui ci dal or not) per pe-
trated in Europe that they dis play forms of be hav iour which make them blend per-
fectly into the sur round ing so cial en vi ron ment (in clear con trast to the dress code 
and as ser tive be hav iour of clas si cal Salafi and Tabligh mem bers, who thus con spicu-
ously pro claim their iden tity). The dis cre tion mani fested by the mem bers of radi cal 
Salafism in Europe is mo ti vated by a Shi’a prin ci ple, that of taki yya, of con ceal ment 
(when nec es sary, even con ceal ment of one’s re li gious be liefs).
It is dif fi cult to an tici pate the Euro pean des tiny of all these ideo logi cal cur-
rents and move ments of Islam ism. The proc ess of re-islamisa tion, which has been 
af fect ing many Mus lim so cie ties for dec ades, has con stantly re ver ber ated across 
the West ern Is lamic com mu nity as well, prompt ing its mem bers to a much 
stronger mo bi li za tion based on their as sert ing their Mus lim iden tity and val ues. 
The fun da men tal prob lem for Euro pean states (and, in fact, for any coun try with a 
po lemic Is lamic ac tiv ism) was, and has re mained, that of iden ti fy ing the most ap-
pro pri ate cul tural, so cial, eco nomic and se cu rity meas ures which could di min ish 
the radi cal ism of some of these move ments.
1 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.
htm (accessed on 26.03.2009).
2 Pascal RADOV, ”Islamisme radical et jihadisme au Royaume-Uni et en Irlande”, in Jean-Luc 
MARRET (dir.), Les fabriques du Jihad, cit., pp. 41-60. 
